Often, …xed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the e¤ect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while …xed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more e¢cient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform o¤-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and even allows to maintain some of the e¢ ciency gains.
Introduction
The Issues at hand. Nine of the ten largest …xed-line carriers in the world own a controlling stake in a mobile operator (Dippon, 2005) . Historically, these carriers entered the mobile markets in its early stage and have kept a strong presence ever since: Today, most incumbent operators own 100% of their mobile arms, which tend to be the largest operator in their market. For example, in Europe 11 out of 14 horizontally-integrated mobile operators were the leaders within their mobile market in 2012 (see the table in the Appendix). In emerging markets, such Brazil, China and Russia, …xed-mobile integration has also begun, with signi…cant implications for their telecoms industry. 1 In a nutshell, today, integration between a mobile network and the …xed-line incumbent is a pervasive and key feature of most communications markets. 2 What is the impact of integration between a …xed and a mobile operator on pricing incentives? Does integration provide a competitive disadvantage to non-integrated operators? Notwithstanding the clear relevance of the problem, these questions have received little attention in the economic literature. Most studies on network competition and interconnection (see the surveys by Armstrong, 2002; Vogelsang, 2003; Harbord and Pagnozzi, 2010) focus on the degree of market competition and the incentives to collude in setting (two-way) access charges in order to relax competition. The role of integration is still unexplored, and our paper aims to …ll this gap.
In our model, we consider the e¤ects of …xed-mobile integration in the presence of call externalities, that is, when customers obtain a positive utility not only from making 1 For example, Telefonica de Espana is moving ahead with plans to merge its Brazilian mobile and …xed-line a¢ liates. 2 The most notable exception is the UK, where BT sold its mobile arm O2 to Telefonica in 2005. Until the recent merger between Orange and T-Mobile, it remained the largest mobile operator in the UK. but also from receiving calls. In our model, one …xed and two mobile operators are present. The mobile operators compete to attract one group of consumers who wish to subscribe to a mobile network and will make calls to all networks. The …xed operator provides access to its own group of customers, which is assumed to be separate from those of the mobile networks. 3 Since calls will be made between the di¤erent groups of customers, new call services emerge: Consumers can make …xed-to-mobile and mobileto-…xed calls. Whenever a call is terminated on or originated by the …xed network, …xed and mobile networks provide essential inputs to each other. In this setting, we analyze the pricing incentives for mobile-to-mobile (MTM), …xed-to-mobile (FTM) and mobile-to-…xed (MTF) calls under both separate ownership, where all three networks are independent of each other, and integration, when a mobile network is integrated with the …xed network.
Our results show that in presence of integration, FTM calls to the rival mobile network are priced signi…cantly above marginal cost, while those to the integrated mobile network are priced below cost. This pricing structure creates an additional disadvantage for the non-integrated mobile network, in terms of market shares and pro…ts, and even magni…es any prior asymmetries. Furthermore, we also show that the integrated networks would prefer FTM termination rates to be set at zero, while the non-integrated network would prefer them to be high.
If remedies were to be imposed on retail prices, we …nd that imposing a uniform pricing constraint on FTM prices eliminates the strategic incentives for excessive FTM prices, while maintaining some of the e¢ ciency gains from integration. The alternative remedy of imposing a functional separation obligation, in order to mimic price setting under separation, also eliminates the incentives for excessive pricing, but foregoes the e¢ ciency gains that are obtained under integration.
Related literature. An important new feature in network competition models is the analysis of retail pricing in the presence of call externalities, i.e. when customers receive utility from receiving calls (Jeon et al., 2004; Berger, 2004 and Cambini and Valletti, 2008; Hermalin and Katz, 2011) . Jeon et al. (2004) show that introducing call externalities strongly modi…es pricing incentives for calls between mobile networks: On-net calls are priced below cost in an attempt to internalize the call externality, while o¤-net prices may be set signi…cantly above cost for strategic reasons, i.e. in order to reduce the number of calls subscribers on rival networks receive, weakening their ability to compete.
This increase in retail prices may even lead to "connectivity breakdowns": In order to discourage subscribers from connecting to the rival, a network has an incentive to charge extremely high o¤-net call prices or o¤-net receiver prices. Cambini and Valletti (2008) show that the risk of a connectivity breakdown is however much diluted when return calls are induced (i.e., calls made and received are complements), and that breakdown is completely eliminated if operators can set a jointly pro…t-maximizing reciprocal access charge. None of these papers however deal with the presence of both mobile and …xed networks, and integration and its impact on pricing incentives.
On the other hand, there exists an equally sizeable economic literature on the relationship between …xed and mobile telephony, see e.g. the survey by Vogelsang (2010) . Wright (2002) considers FTM calls with a focus on mobile termination rates, while others (e.g. Valletti and Houpis, 2005) analyze how socially optimal FTM termination charges would depend on the magnitude of network externalities, the intensity of competition in the mobile sector, and the distribution of customer preferences. Armstrong and Wright (2009) integrate the above two streams of literature into a unifying model and analyze the impact of introducing a uniform (FTM and MTM) termination charge. They show that imposing uniform access charges (set either unilaterally or cooperatively) leads mobile networks to set a termination charge below the monopoly level but above the level that they would set if MTM termination could be priced separately.
Still, there is no academic publication considering the issue of integration between …xed and mobile networks and the pricing incentives for on-net and o¤-net calls. The papers closest to ours are Cambini (2001) , who considers vertical integration between local and long-distance communications providers and the resulting problems of oneway wholesale access (there is no corresponding retail pricing analysis, though), and Mu (2008), who analyzes symmetric competition between two pairs of integrated …xed and mobile networks and the necessity of regulating mobile termination rates. The latter paper does …nd that the integrated …rm internalizes termination payments, i.e. does not take termination rates into account when setting its retail prices for calls between its parts, but neglects the decisive issues of asymmetric mobile market outcomes and call externalities.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 presents the retail pricing equilibrium in our benchmark case, i.e., the case in which networks are non-integrated, while in Section 4 we study equilibrium outcomes when the …xed and a mobile network are integrated. In Section 5 we propose potential regulatory remedies to limit the negative impact of integration on market outcomes. Section 6 concludes.
Networks, costs and tari¤s. Consider a mobile telephony market with two potentially asymmetric networks. Mobile network 1 is owned by the monopoly …xed network, while mobile network 2 is independent. We assume that consumers in the mobile and …xed markets fall into di¤erent groups. Competition in the mobile market is modeled in Hotelling fashion as in La¤ont et al. (1998) , while networks are asymmetric as in Carter and Wright (1999) and Hoernig (2007) . The …xed network's retail prices are unregulated.
For simplicity, we only consider the …xed network's choice of FTM price and monthly subscription fee. 4 All networks are interconnected and terminate incoming calls charging termination rates which are set by the sectoral regulator. The central assumption that we make is that mobile network 1 and the …xed network choose their retail tari¤s jointly.
There is a mass 1 of consumers in the mobile market, and a mass N of consumers in the …xed market. Mobile market shares are i 0, i = 1; 2, with i + j = 1, where network j generically denotes network i's rival. Mobile networks have symmetric costs and termination rates. 5 Each mobile network incurs a monthly …xed cost per customer f and has on-net call costs of c = c o + c t per minute, where c o and c t are its origination and termination cost, respectively. The regulated mobile termination rate is denoted by a, and therefore, the per-minute cost of an o¤-net call to the other mobile network is
The …xed network has a monthly …xed cost of f x , and its per-minute costs of an FTM call to either mobile network are c xo + a, where c xo is its origination cost. Note that we assume, as in Armstrong and Wright (2009) , that the termination charge both for MTM and FTM calls is uniform, that is, independent of the call's origin. Similarly, the per-minute cost of an MTF call is c o + a x , where a x is the …xed network's regulated termination rate.
Mobile network i o¤ers a multi-part tari¤ (F i ; p i ;p i ;p i ) which consists of a monthly …xed fee F i , and of per-minute prices p i for on-net calls,p i for o¤-net calls to the other mobile network, andp i for calls to the …xed network. The …xed network o¤ers a multipart tari¤ (F x ; z 1 ; z 2 ) comprising a …xed fee F x and per-minute call prices z 1 and z 2 to mobile networks 1 and 2, respectively.
Consumers and market shares. We assume that each mobile or …xed subscriber makes calls to all potential recipients with equal probability. Mobile subscribers receive a …xed utility A i from being connected to network i, with A 1 A 2 . Fixed subscribers obtain a …xed utility A x from subscription to the …xed network. 6 Subscribers also obtain utility u(q) from making and u(q) from receiving a call of length q, where 0 1
indicates the strength of the call externality. The corresponding caller net surplus at price
etc., and similarly for v and u. Finally, we de…ne q
For a given mobile consumer, the surplus of subscribing to mobile network i = 1; 2, apart from the …xed utility A i , is given by
The Hotelling market share of network i is then
where > 0 measures the strength of horizontal di¤erentiation. Solving this implicit condition for the market share i leads to
where
A consumer in the …xed market with connection utility A x subscribes if his net surplus is non-negative, that is, if
We assume that A x is large enough so that in equilibrium the …xed network is active.
Pro…ts and welfare. Mobile network i's pro…ts are given by
The …rst two terms contain the pro…ts from subscriptions and on-net calls, whereas the third and fourth terms represent the pro…ts from o¤-net call origination and termination to the other mobile and …xed network, respectively.
The …xed network's pro…ts are
Finally, consumer surplus is given by
where the negative term represents the total Hotelling transportation costs, and total welfare is
In the following we will consider Nash equilibria where all three networks choose their tari¤s simultaneously. To begin with, we provide a benchmark where network 1 and the …xed network are not jointly owned, i.e. set prices independently. Then, in a second step we consider the Nash equilibrium under integration, where the …xed network and mobile network 1 maximize their joint pro…ts, x + 1 . In a last step, we revisit the equilibria when remedies have been imposed.
A Benchmark: Non-Integrated Networks
As a …rst step, we determine market outcomes with separately owned networks. In this benchmark, all three networks choose their tari¤s simultaneously and independently to maximize their respective pro…ts, taking the other networks'tari¤s as given.
For the …xed market, the …xed network sets the subscription fee F x such that condition
(2) holds with equality, hence,
Substituting F x into the pro…ts (4) and dropping the terms that do not depend on the FTM call prices, the …xed network chooses z 1 and z 2 to maximize
Using the fact that dv x i =dz i = q x i , the maximum is obtained at
that is, without integration FTM calls are priced at marginal cost. 8 The intuition behind this result is that the …xed network only considers its own callers and pro…ts. Otherwise stated, it does not take into account externalities on receivers and mobile networks.
Mobile networks, on the other hand, choose their optimal call prices while keeping surplus w i (and therefore market shares) constant, by adjusting …xed fees F i accordingly.
Optimal call prices are therefore found by substituting F i from the market share equation
(1) into the pro…ts (3), and by isolating the relevant terms. For the on-net call price,
Using the fact that du i =dp i = p i q 0 i , we obtain the solution p N i = c= (1 + ). As is well-known, for on-net calls the call externality is fully internalized and the mobile networks optimally choose the e¢ cient price level. The price for o¤-net calls to the other mobile networkp i is found by maximizing
As in Jeon et al. (2004) , the resulting o¤-net price iŝ
This o¤-net MTM price is strategically distorted upwards due to the positive externality that subscribers of the rival network obtain when they receive a call.
Finally, the MTF call price is set in order to maximizẽ
This expression again does not contain any externality term. Thus, the MTF price is also set at marginal cost,p
Finally, we determine the equilibrium …xed fees and the resulting market shares. First, note that from (1) we have
H .
The …rst-order condition for maximizing mobile network i's pro…ts i with respect to F i leads to …xed fees and pro…ts
with
(a c t ) q x i being pro…ts from incoming and outgoing calls. The …xed fee decreases in the FTM pro…tP i , which means that the "waterbed e¤ect" is at play, i.e. the phenomenon that pro…ts from …xed-to-mobile termination are handed on to consumers through a lower monthly fee. 9 Since this waterbed e¤ect is full here, mobile networks'pro…ts are not a¤ected. Furthermore, the equilibrium prices computed above imply that h ix = h jx , and together withP i =P j , we obtain that market shares (1) do not depend on the presence of the …xed network under non-integration.
In the case where subscription surpluses A 1 and A 2 are identical, we obtain a symmetric equilibrium where i = 1=2 and N i = N j . In the following we will compare these outcomes to those obtained under integration.
Integrated Networks

Equilibrium tari¤s
Now we assume that mobile network 1 and the …xed network are integrated. The …xed network has no in ‡uence on the independent mobile network's pricing decisions, so net- 9 The waterbed e¤ect has some empirical relevance, as shown by Genakos and Valletti (2011) . In particular, their results suggest that, although regulation in Europe reduced termination rates by about 10% to the bene…t of callers to mobile phones from …xed lines, it also led to a 5% increase (varying between 2%-15% depending on the estimate) in mobile retail prices. work 2 continues to set the on-net price p I 2 = c=(1 + ), MTF pricep I 2 = c o + a x and MTM o¤-net pricep I 2 , given by (7) for new equilibrium market shares. On the other hand, network 1 and the …xed network maximize the sum of their …xed and mobile profits, 1 + x . Holding market shares …xed and substituting F 1 and F x as above, we …nd that mobile on-net and o¤-net prices are set as above, that is, p I 1 = c=(1 + ) andp I 1 is as in (7). What does change, though, are the relevant terms for determining the prices of FTM calls to either mobile network and the MTF calls of network 1.
The optimal MTF call pricep 1 is found by maximizing
Two externalities are internalized in this choice: …rst, the termination payment; and second, the receiver utility. Thus, the relevant marginal costs are the origination cost on the mobile network and the termination cost on the …xed network. Network 1's strategic marginal cost is even lower, since it also internalizes the call externality. The resulting MTF price is at the e¢ cient level,p
This price is lower than the MTF price without integration for two reasons: First, marginal cost contains the termination cost c xt and not the potentially higher termination rate a x ; second, the integrated network takes into account that receivers of these calls are also its clients; by lowering the MTF price it creates more surplus if > 0, which can then be extracted through higher …xed fees.
Exactly the same two externalities are internalized in this case, so the optimal FTM price for calls to the partner mobile network becomes
Again, this FTM price is lower than without integration since c t a and > 0.
On the other hand, the terms relevant for the FTM price of calls to network 2 are
which now contains the strategic marginal cost of network 2's clients receiving calls from the …xed network. Taking these into account leads to
which shows that the incentives for o¤-net FTM pricing are identical to those for o¤-net MTM pricing in (7). Compared to (6), the FTM price to the non-integrated network is distorted upwards. Furthermore, it continues to be based on the mobile termination rate instead of the lower mobile termination cost.
Finally, network 2's …xed fee F I 2 is formally identical to (10). The integrated network, on the other hand, solves max F 1 ;Fx f x + 1 g subject to …xed users'surplus being non-negative. After substituting F x from (5), we can compute the …rst-order condition for F 1 and solve it for 
Market outcomes
We now determine the e¤ect of the integrated networks' equilibrium tari¤ choices on market shares and pro…ts. We …rst study whether the integrated mobile network gains an advantage over the non-integrated one due to integration, and second how this a¤ects their respective pro…ts. As an additional step, we analyze whether integration ampli…es or dampens any initial asymmetry between networks.
Concerning market shares and pro…ts, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 Compared to the Nash equilibrium without integration, the integrated mobile network has a higher equilibrium market share. The di¤erence increases in the size of the …xed market N and the strength of the call externality .
Proof. Holding for now market shares and therefore o¤-net call prices and H = h ii + h jj h ji h ij …xed at the non-integrated level H, expression (1) results in a new estimate for the market share of …rm 1, that is,
After substituting the …xed fee in the equilibrium under integration, and denoting the total welfare from an exchange of calls between the …xed network and mobile network i by
where the terms in const do not depend on MTF or FTM prices. Sincep 1 and z 1 are lowered from marginal cost (including the termination rate) to the e¢ cient level andp 2 and z 2 are raised from cost to an even higher level, W 1 W 2 increases, and thus 0 1 lies above the non-integrated market share. Since under stability there is a unique equilibrium market share, this implies that in the integrated equilibrium network 1's (network 2's) market share rises (decreases). This e¤ect increases in N . Furthermore, W 1 W 2 increases in since in W 1 prices are e¢ ciently set and in W 2 they become increasingly distorted.
The di¤erence in market shares increases in the strength of the call externality and the size of the …xed customer base N . Integration has an e¤ect even for = 0, because the integrated network charges a lower FTM price due to the internalization of the mobile termination rate.
An additional issue of interest is whether pricing under integration ampli…es or reduces ex-ante asymmetries, and how it a¤ects pro…ts.
Proposition 2 If the strength of call externality is small, then in the Nash equilibrium under integration:
1. Any ex-ante market share asymmetry in favour of the integrated …rm is magni…ed.
2. The non-integrated rival's pro…ts decrease.
Proof. 1. First we establish that for small the term H has a local minimum at 1 = 1=2 and is quasiconvex. The Taylor expansion of dH=d 1 around = 0 is
The …rst term cuts the horizontal axis from below and equals zero at^ 1 = 1=2. This implies that if is small then H has a unique stationary point, which is a local minimum at^ 1 . Therefore H is quasiconvex.
Second, since A 1 > A 2 , the market share 1 is above 1=2 before integration, and increases further after integration. We conclude that H increases with 1 , and therefore also (1 H) 1 in (1), which is the multiplier of the surplus di¤erence A 1 A 2 .
2. Network 2's pro…ts are given by
. Both the factor 2 2 andP N 2 decrease (the latter due to lower call and termination pro…ts) and H increases,
It is now possible to determine the equilibrium pro…t of the integrated …rm, 1 + x .
Using (5) and (17), we obtain
Given that termination payments are internalized, the equilibrium pro…t is equal to the MTM pro…t (…rst component) plus the value (utility plus pro…t) generated from FTM calls to the non-integrated mobile operator 2.
From this expression for the integrated pro…ts, we can easily conclude what level for FTM termination charges (as opposed to MTM ones) the integrated network will prefer.
This question needs to be seen on the background that non-integrated …xed networks prefer very low termination rates because they constitute a cost, while mobile networks prefer very high FTM termination rates. How will this con ‡ict of interest be resolved under integration?
Corollary 1 The integrated networks prefer a zero FTM termination rate over a positive one.
Proof. Since d (v x 2 + ũ 2 + Z 2 ) =da = q x 2 if z 2 is chosen optimally, the integrated network's pro…ts are decreasing in a.
The intuition for this result is that the integrated equilibrium pro…ts do not depend on pro…ts related to tra¢ c between the two integrated networks because termination payments cancel out. On the other hand, for the same reason, the e¤ect of tra¢ c to the other mobile network is reinforced, through the adjusted …xed fee (17). To be precise, what the integrated network actually prefers is a low FTM termination rate on its rival network, while it is indi¤erent about this rate on its mobile arm.
In this section we consider two potential remedies, in case the e¤ects of integration outlined above are considered market failures: i) an obligation to set uniform FTM prices, i.e., the integrated …xed network must charge the same FTM price for calls to either mobile network; ii) functional separation, at the retail pricing level, between the integrated …xed and mobile businesses, i.e., FTM and MTF prices would have to be set as if networks were not integrated.
It is immediately clear that functional separation reproduces the retail pricing outcome without integration, that is, z 1 = z 2 = c xo + a as in (6) andp i = c o + a x as in (8). While this obligation establishes the call pricing structure without integration, it foregoes the bene…ts from the internalization of the termination rates that arises under integration.
Let us now consider uniform FTM pricing. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 If a uniform FTM price is imposed, in equilibrium it will be set equal to the average network cost, internalizing the integrated mobile network's termination rate:
Proof. Under the obligation to set z 2 = z 1 z U , the …xed network maximizes the sum of the terms depending on z 1 and z 2 in (13) and (15), that is,
from which the above result follows directly.
Two observations are in order. First, just as with pricing of calls between mobile networks, under a uniform price the call externalities do not matter and therefore do not in ‡uence equilibrium pricing. Second, the resulting FTM price is below the nonintegration one, due to a lower average network cost. As a result of this remedy, the FTM price towards the integrated mobile network increases by relatively little from z I 1 to z U , while the FTM price to the other mobile network decrease more strongly from z I 2 to z U . Thus, total welfare should be expected to increase when this remedy is imposed.
Conclusions
Integration between …xed and mobile operators is typical of many national communications markets. In this paper we analyze the impact of …xed-mobile integration on retail pricing incentives, which is a rather unexplored issue in the literature.
We show that FTM calls to rival mobile networks will be priced signi…cantly above marginal cost, while those to the integrated mobile network will be priced below cost.
Our results show that this pricing structure creates an additional disadvantage for nonintegrated mobile networks, in terms of market shares and pro…ts, and even magni…es existing asymmetries. On the policy side, we …nd that the potential remedy of imposing a uniform pricing constraint on FTM prices leads to a signi…cantly more e¢ cient pricing structure, which is also better than the alternative remedy of function separation.
Our framework is suitable to be extended in di¤erent directions. First, it is possible to extend the analysis considering …xed-to-mobile substitution. The latter can occur at the level of calls if consumers subscribe to both a …xed and a mobile network (Armstrong and Wright, 2009) , or at the level of access, i.e. consumers decide about which and how many networks to subscribe to. Fixed-mobile integration may also imply that consumers are o¤ered bundles involving both …xed and mobile services, which should be analyzed by introducing bundling strategies into a network competition framework. Both extensions are dealt with in our companion papers. 
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